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Abstract
In this paper, we study the single-population evolutionary game and construct an algorithm to ﬁnd evolutionarily stable strategies.
Finally, by an example, we illuminate the computing process of algorithm.
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1. Introduction
In 1973, Maynard Smith and Price studied the Hawk–Dove game and introduced the notion of evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), see [3]. An ESS indicates a stable state of the process of evolution and it is a proper equilibrium
[2, Theorem 9.3.4]. Though evolutionary game theory originated from biological game, it is applied successfully in
many ﬁeld besides biology, for example, economics, management science and so on.
Very regretfully, the algorithm for ESSs is rare until today. In this paper, we ﬁrst give a theorem to ﬁnd ESSs for 2×2
evolutionary games, then construct an algorithm to ﬁnd ESSs for n × n evolutionary games. Finally, by an example,
we illuminate the computing process of algorithm. For other algorithm relating to ESSs, we refer the reader to [1] and
references therein.
For a given population of a certain “species”, each individual adopt one of strategies S={s1, s2, . . . , sn} in the contest
for survival with the other members of the population. The process may be seen as a two-person n×n symmetric game
{, U}, where  = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn) :∑ni=1xi = 1, xi0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of mixed strategies, and
U =
⎛
⎜⎝
a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 a22 · · · a2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 an2 · · · ann
⎞
⎟⎠ (1)
denotes the ﬁtness (or payoff) matrix.
 Supported by NSF of Chongqing and by Science Foundations of Chongqing Jiaotong University.
E-mail address: linzhi7525@163.com.
0377-0427/$ - see front matter © 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/j.cam.2007.06.025
158 Z. Lin / Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 217 (2008) 157 --165
For an individual who chooses strategy x ∈  against the strategy y ∈  chosen by the rest of the population, the
ﬁtness (or payoff) is
W(x, y) = xUyT. (2)
Let xn = 1 −∑n−1i=1 xi . Thus,  = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, 1 −∑n−1i=1 xi) :∑n−1i=1 xi1, xi0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, and
W(x, y) = W(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, y1, y2, . . . , yn−1)
=
(
x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, 1 −
n−1∑
i=1
xi
)⎛⎜⎝
a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 a22 · · · a2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 an2 · · · ann
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
y1
y2
...
yn−1
1 −
n−1∑
i=1
yi
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (3)
Above two-person n × n symmetric game {, U} is said to be an n × n evolutionary game. In particular, if n = 2,
individual’s pure strategy set S = {s1, s2} and mixed strategy set  = {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 1, x1, x20} and ﬁtness
matrix is
U =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, (4)
and the ﬁtness is W(x, y) = xUyT, for each (x, y) ∈  × .
The well-known Hawk–Dove game is a 2 × 2 evolutionary game.
Consider an n × n evolutionary game n = {n, Un} (brieﬂy,  = {, U}), if let xi = 0 for some i, then we
obtain an (n − 1) × (n − 1) evolutionary game n−1i = {n−1i , Un−1i }, where n−1i = {(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) :
x1 + · · · + xi−1 + xi+1 + · · · + xn = 1, xj 0, j = i} and,
Un−1i =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a11 · · · a1(i−1) a1(i+1) · · · a1n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
a(i−1)1 · · · a(i−1)(i−1) a(i−1)(i+1) · · · a(i−1)n
a(i+1)1 · · · a(i+1)(i−1) a(i+1)(i+1) · · · a(i+1)n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 · · · an(i−1) an(i+1) · · · ann
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5)
n−1i is said to be a subgame of n. Clearly, there are n subgames of n.
2. Preliminaries
The following deﬁnition can be found in [4].
Deﬁnition 2.1. A strategy x∗ ∈  is said to be an ESS for evolutionarily game  = {, U}, if and only if for each
y ∈ :
(1) W(x∗, x∗)W(y, x∗);
(2) if y = x∗ and W(x∗, x∗) = W(y, x∗), then W(x∗, y)>W(y, y).
By Deﬁnition 2.1 (1), if x is an ESS, then (x, x) must be a Nash equilibrium, but the contrary need not be true.
Clearly, for some i (n i1), if (x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , xn) is an ESS for n, then (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
must be an ESS for the subgame ni .
Denote by ESS the set of all ESSs for the evolutionary game n.
The following lemma can be found in [5, Proposition 2.3, pp. 41].
Lemma 2.1. The set ESS of ESSs is finite. ESS = {x} if x ∈ ESS ∩ int(), where int() denotes the interior of .
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3. An algorithm for evolutionarily stability strategies
3.1. Evolutionarily stability strategies for a 2 × 2 evolutionary game
Theorem 3.1. Consider a 2 × 2 evolutionary game  = {, U}, where  = {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 1, x1, x20} =
{(x1, 1 − x1) : 1x10}, and
U =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
.
(1) If a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 0 and a11 = a21 (thus a22 = a12), then{
when a11 >a21 (thus a22 <a12) (1, 0) is a unique ESS,
when a11 <a21 (thus a22 >a12) (0, 1) is a unique ESS.
(2) If a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 0 and a11 = a21 (thus a22 = a12), then the set of ESSs is empty.
(3) If a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 0 and a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 /∈ [0, 1], then only two cases are possible:{
Case 1 : when a11 >a21 and a22 <a12 (1, 0) is a unique ESS,
Case 2 : when a11 <a21 and a22 >a12 (0, 1) is a unique ESS,
(4) If a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 < 0 and a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ∈ [0, 1] (thus a11 − a210 and a22 − a120, but two equalities
cannot hold meanwhile), then ( a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a11−a21
a11−a12−a21+a22 ) is a unique ESS.
(5) If a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 > 0 and a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ∈ [0, 1], then only three cases are possible:{Case 1 : When a11 >a21 and a22 >a12 (1, 0) and (0, 1) both are ESSs,
Case 2 : When a11 >a21 and a22 = a12 (1, 0) is a unique ESS,
Case 3 : When a11 = a21 and a22 >a12 (0, 1) is a unique ESS.
Proof. (1) Assume that x = (x1, 1 − x1) is an ESS. For each y = (y1, 1 − y1) ∈ ,
W(x, x) − W(y, x) = (x1 − y1, y1 − x1)
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
x1
1 − x1
)
= (x1 − y1)[(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)x1 + a12 − a22] = (x1 − y1)(a12 − a22)0.
When a11 >a21 (thus a22 <a12), we derive x1 = 1, and it is easy to verify that (1, 0) is a unique ESS by Deﬁnition
2.1; and when a11 <a21 (thus a22 >a12), we derive x1 = 0, and it is easy to verify that (0, 1) is a unique ESS by
Deﬁnition 2.1.
(2) Assume that x = (x1, 1 − x1) is an ESS. For each y = (y1, 1 − y1) ∈ , W(x, x) − W(y, x) = 0, but
W(x, y) − W(y, y) = (x1 − y1, y1 − x1)
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
y1
1 − y1
)
= (x1 − y1)[(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)y1 + a12 − a22] = 0≯0
a contradiction.
(3) Assume that x = (x1, 1 − x1) is an ESS. For each y = (y1, 1 − y1) = x, y ∈ , W(x, x) − W(y, x) = (x1 −
y1)[(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)x1 + a12 − a22]0. Note that (a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)x1 + a12 − a22 = 0, otherwise it
contradicts with the fact a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 /∈ [0, 1]. Thus, only two cases are possible: either x1 = 1 or x1 = 0.
(a) If a11 >a21 and a22a12, then a11−a12−a21+a22 >a22−a120,which contradictswith a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 /∈ [0, 1].(b) If a11 >a21 and a22 <a12, it is easy to verify that (1, 0) is a unique ESS.
(c) If a11 = a21 and a22 = a12, then a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ∈ [0, 1], a contradiction.
160 Z. Lin / Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 217 (2008) 157 --165
(d) If a11 = a21 and a22 = a12, then it contradicts with a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 0.
(e) If a11 <a21 and a22 >a12, it is easy to verify that (0, 1) is an unique ESS.
(f) If a11 <a21, a22a12, then it contradicts with a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 /∈ [0, 1].
(4) First, we prove that x = ( a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a11−a21
a11−a12−a21+a22 ) is an ESS.
For each y = (y1, 1 − y1) = x, W(x, x) − W(y, x) = 0, but W(x, y) − W(y, y) = −(a11 − a12 − a21 +
a22)(
a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 − y1)2 > 0. Thus, (
a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a11−a21
a11−a12−a21+a22 ) is an ESS.
If z= (z1, 1− z1) = x is also an ESS, then W(z, z)−W(x, z)= (a11 −a12 −a21 +a22)( a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 − z1)2 < 0,
a contradiction.
(5) First we prove that ( a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a11−a21
a11−a12−a21+a22 ) is not an ESS. For each y = x, y ∈ ,W(x, x)−W(y, x)=
0, butW(x, y)−W(y, y)=−(a11−a12−a21+a22)( a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 −y1)2 < 0, i.e., (
a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a11−a21
a11−a12−a21+a22 )
is not an ESS.
Assume that x = (x1, 1−x1) is an ESS. For each y = (y1, 1−y1) ∈ , W(x, x)−W(y, x)= (x1 −y1)[(a11 −a12 −
a21 + a22)x1 + a12 − a22]0. Note that (a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)x1 + a12 − a22 = 0, otherwise x1 = a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ,
a contradiction. Thus, only two cases are possible: either x1 = 1 or x1 = 0.
(a) If a11 >a21 and a22 >a12, then it is easy to verify that (1, 0) and (0, 1) both are ESSs.
(b) If a11 >a21 and a22 = a12, then it is easy to verify that (1, 0) is an unique ESS.
(c) If a11 >a21 and a22 <a12, then it contradicts with a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ∈ [0, 1].
(d) If a11 = a21 and a22 >a12, then it is easy to verify that (0, 1) is an unique ESS.
(e) If a11 = a21 and a22a12, then a11 − a12 − a21 + a220, a contradiction.
(f) If a11 <a21 and a22 >a12, then it contradicts with a22−a12a11−a12−a21+a22 ∈ [0, 1].(g) If a11 <a21 and a22a12, then a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 <a22 − a120, a contradiction.
Our proof is ﬁnished. 
Remark 3.1. Theorem 3.1 includes Theorem 9.2.3 in [2] as a special case.
3.2. Evolutionarily stability strategies for an n × n evolutionary game
We ﬁrst give next Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Consider an n × n evolutionary game  = {, U}. If x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, 1 −∑n−1i=1 xi) ∈ int() is
an ESS, then for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
W(y, x)
yi
= W(y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)
yi
= 0,
where W(y, x) = yUxT.
Proof. Since x is an ESS, then (x, x) is a Nash equilibrium point. Note thatW(y, x) is differentiable on int()×int(),
thus the result follows. 
By Lemmas 2.1, 3.1 and Deﬁnition 2.1, we have the following result.
Corollary 3.1. Assume that x is an ESS for an n × n evolutionary game  = {, U}. If x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, 1 −∑n−1
i=1 xi) ∈ int(), then x is a unique ESS and for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
W(y, x)
yi
= W(y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)
yi
= 0.
If x ∈ () (assume that xi = 0), then x = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) must be an ESS for the subgame i of ,
where () denotes the boundary of  and x is said to be the corresponding point of x in .
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Following we construct an algorithm to ﬁnd ESSs for an n × n evolutionary game n0 = {n0, Un0 }(n> 2).
Step 1: Let I = n, J = 0, C(I) = 1, ESS = ∅.
Step 2: Consider the evolutionary game IJ = {IJ , UIJ }.
Step 3: Case 1. If I > 2.
Solve next system of linear equations:
WIJ (y, x)
yi
= W
I
J (y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)
yi
= 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
where WIJ (y, x) = yUIJ xT , x, y ∈ IJ .
(1) If there is an unique solution x0 ∈ int(IJ ) for above system of linear equations. Denote by x0 the corresponding
point of x0 in n0. Checking x0 by Deﬁnition 2.1, if x0 is not an ESS of IJ , then let C(I) = J, I = I − 1, J = 1, goto
Step 2; and if x0 is an ESS of IJ , then:
(a) If I = n. Let ESS = {x0}, goto Step 7.
(b) If I <n. Check x0 by Deﬁnition 2.1, if x0 is an ESS of n0, let ESS = ESS ∪ {x0} and goto next step, otherwise
goto Step 6.
(2) If there is an inﬁnite solution set Q ⊂ int(IJ ) for above system of linear equations. Finding ESS in Q by
Deﬁnition 2.1, if there is not an ESS x0 ∈ Q for IJ , let C(I)= J, I = I − 1, J = 1, goto Step 2; and if there is an ESS
x0 ∈ Q for IJ , then:
(a) If I = n. Let ESS = {x0} and goto Step 7.
(b) If I <n. Denote by x0 the corresponding point of x0 in n0. Checking x0 by Deﬁnition 2.1, if x0 is an ESS of n0,
let ESS = ESS ∪ {x0} and goto next step, otherwise goto Step 6.
(3) If there is not solution x0 ∈ int(IJ ) for above system of linear equations. Let C(I) = J, I = I − 1, J = 1 and
goto Step 2.
Case 2: If I = 2. By Theorem 3.1, we obtain the set E ⊂ IJ of ESSs for IJ , which correspond to the set E in
n0. By Deﬁnition 2.1, checking those points in E one by one, we gain the subset set E0 ⊂ n0 of ESSs for n0. Let
ESS = ESS ∪ E0.
If I =n−1, J = I +1, goto Step 7; if I <n−1, J = I +1, goto next step; and if I <n−1, J < I +1, let J =J +1,
goto Step 2.
Step 4: Let I = I + 1, J = C(I) + 1.
Step 5: If I = n − 1 and J > I + 1, go Step 7. If I <n − 1 and J > I + 1, go Step 4. If I <n − 1 and J I + 1,
goto Step 2.
Step 6: If J = I + 1, goto Step 4, otherwise let J = J + 1 and goto Step 2.
Step 7: End the algorithm and the set of ESSs for n0 is ESS.
Remark 3.2. Above algorithm can ﬁnd all ESSs for n×n evolutionary games and it is simpler than Bomze’s algorithm
in [1].
4. An example
Example 4.1. Consider a 4×4 evolutionary game40={40, U40 }, where40={(x1, x2, x3, x4) : x1, x2, x3, x40, x1+
x2 + x3 + x4 = 1} = {(x1, x2, x3, 1 − x1 − x2 − x3) : x1, x2, x30, x1 + x2 + x31} and
U40 =
⎛
⎜⎝
3 −2 4 −1
4 −2 1 4
−1 3 3 −2
1 2 −1 3
⎞
⎟⎠ .
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Next we ﬁnd all ESSs for 40.
(1) For x = (x1, x2, x3, 1 − x1 − x2 − x3), y = (y1, y2, y3, 1 − y1 − y2 − y3) ∈ 40, W 40 (y, x) = yU40xT. Let⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
W 40
y1
= 0
W 40
y2
= 0
W 40
y3
= 0
⇒
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
6x1 + 9x3 = 4
2x1 − 5x2 + x3 = −1
3x1 + 6x2 + 9x3 = 5
⇒
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x1 = 1121 ,
x2 = 37 ,
x3 = 221 ,
i.e., x = ( 1121 , 37 , 221 ,− 121 ) /∈40.
(2) Consider four subgames of 40 one by one.
(1) For 40, let x1 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 31 = {31, U31 }, where
U31 =
(−2 1 4
3 3 −2
2 −1 3
)
.
31 = {(x2, x3, x4) : x2, x3, x40, x2 + x3 + x4 = 1} = {(x2, x3, 1 − x2 − x3) : x2, x30, x2 + x31}.
For x = (x2, x3, 1 − x2 − x3), y = (y2, y3, 1 − y2 − y3) ∈ 31, W 31 (y, x) = yU31xT. Let⎧⎨
⎩
W 31
y2
= 0
W 31
y3
= 0
⇒
{−5x2 + x3 = −1
6x2 + 9x3 = 5
⇒
{
x2 = 1451 ,
x3 = 1951 ,
i.e., x = ( 1451 , 1951 , 617 ) ∈ int(31).
By Deﬁnition 2.1, check ( 1451 ,
19
51 ,
6
17 ) for 
3
1. For each y = ( 1451 , 1951 , 617 ), W 31 (x, x) − W 31 (y, x) = 0, but W 31 (x, y) −
W 31 (y, y) = 5y22 − 7y2y3 − 9y23 − 751y2 + 44051 y3 − 2717 .
Taking y = (0, 0, 1) ∈ 31, we have W 31 (x, y) − W 31 (y, y) = − 2717 < 0, i.e., x = ( 1451 , 1951 , 617 ) is not an ESS for 31,
thus (0, 1451 ,
19
51 ,
6
17 ) is not an ESS for 
4
0.
Next consider three subgames of 31 one by one.
(A) For 31, let x2 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 212 = {212, U212}, where
U212 =
(
3 −2
−1 3
)
.
212 = {(x3, x4) : x3, x40, x3 + x4 = 1} = {(x3, 1 − x3) : 1x30}.
By Theorem 3.1, 212 has two ESSs (1, 0) and (0, 1), which correspond to (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) in 40,
respectively.
ByDeﬁnition 2.1, check x=(0, 0, 1, 0) for40. For each y=(y1, y2, y3, 1−y1−y2−y3) ∈ 40, y = x,W 40 (x, x)−
W 40 (y, x)= (x − y)U40 xT =−5y1 − 2y2 − 4y3 + 4. Taking y = (1, 0, 0, 0) = x, W 40 (x, x)−W 40 (y, x)=−1< 0,
i.e., x = (0, 0, 1, 0) is not an ESS for 40.
Similarly, we check x=(0, 0, 0, 1). Taking y=( 110 , 910 , 0, 0) = x,W 40 (x, x)−W 40 (y, x)=− 12 < 0, i.e., (0, 0, 0, 1)
is not an ESS for 40.
(B) For 31, let x3 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 213 = {213, U213}, where
U213 =
(−2 4
2 3
)
.
213 = {(x2, x4) : x2, x40, x2 + x4 = 1} = {(x2, 1 − x2) : 1x20}.
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By Theorem 3.1, 213 has a unique ESS (
1
5 ,
4
5 ), which corresponds to (0,
1
5 , 0,
4
5 ) in 40.
By Deﬁnition 2.1, check x = (0, 15 , 0, 45 ) for 40. For each y = (y1, y2, y3, 1 − y1 − y2 − y3) ∈ 40, y = x,
W 40 (x, x) − W 40 (y, x) = (x − y)U40 xT = 4y1 + 195 y3.
When y1 > 0 or y3 > 0, we have W 40 (x, x) − W 40 (y, x)> 0, i.e., the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.1 hold; and when
y1 = 0 and y3 = 0, we have W 40 (x, x) − W 40 (y, x) = 0, but W 40 (x, y) − W 40 (y, y) = 5( 15 − y2)2 > 0, i.e., the
conditions of Deﬁnition 2.1 also hold. Thus, (0, 15 , 0,
4
5 ) is an ESS for 
4
0.
(C) For 31, let x4 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 314 = {314, U314}, where
U314 =
(−2 1
3 3
)
.
314 = {(x2, x3) : x2, x30, x2 + x3 = 1} = {(x2, 1 − x2) : 1x20}.
By Theorem 3.1, 314 has a unique ESS (0, 1), which corresponds to (0, 0, 1, 0) in 40. It has been checked above.
(2) For 40, let x2 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 32 = {32, U32 }, where
U32 =
( 3 4 −1
−1 3 −2
1 −1 3
)
.
32 = {(x1, x3, x4) : x1, x3, x40, x1 + x3 + x4 = 1} = {(x1, x3, 1 − x1 − x3) : x1, x30, x1 + x31}.
For x = (x1, x3, 1 − x1 − x3), y = (y1, y3, 1 − y1 − y3) ∈ 32, W 32 (y, x) = yU32xT. Let⎧⎨
⎩
W 32
y1
= 0
W 32
y3
= 0
⇒
{6x1 + 9x3 = 4
3x1 + 9x3 = 5
⇒
{
x1 = − 13 ,
x3 = 23 ,
i.e., x = (− 13 , 23 , 23 ) /∈32.
Next consider three subgames of 32 one by one.
(A) For 32, let x1 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 221 = 212, which has been considered above.
(B) For 32, let x3 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 223 = {223, U223}, where
U223 =
(
3 −1
1 3
)
.
223 = {(x1, x4) : x1, x40, x1 + x4 = 1} = {(x1, 1 − x1) : 1x10}.
By Theorem 3.1, 223 has two ESSs (1, 0) and (0, 1), which corresponds to (1, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) in 40,
respectively. (0, 0, 0, 1) has been checked above.
ByDeﬁnition 2.1, check x=(1, 0, 0, 0) for40. Taking y=(0, 1, 0, 0) ∈ 40, y = x,W 40 (x, x)−W 40 (y, x)=−1< 0,
i.e., (1, 0, 0, 0) is not an ESS for 40.
(C) For 32, let x4 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 224 = {224, U224}, where
U224 =
(
3 4
−1 3
)
.
224 = {(x1, x3) : x1, x30, x1 + x3 = 1} = {(x1, 1 − x1) : 1x10}.
By Theorem 3.1, 224 has a unique ESS (1, 0), which corresponds to x = (1, 0, 0, 0) in 40. It has been checked
above.
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(3) For 40, let x3 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 33 = {33, U33 }, where
U33 =
(3 −2 −1
4 −2 4
1 2 3
)
.
33 = {(x1, x2, x4) : x1, x2, x40, x1 + x2 + x4 = 1} = {(x1, x2, 1 − x1 − x2) : x1, x20, x1 + x21}.
For x = (x1, x2, 1 − x1 − x2), y = (y1, y2, 1 − y1 − y2) ∈ 33, W 33 (y, x) = yU33xT. Let⎧⎨
⎩
W 33
y1
= 0
W 33
y2
= 0
⇒
{ 6x1 = 4
2x1 − 5x2 = −1
⇒
{
x1 = 23 ,
x2 = 715 ,
i.e., x = ( 23 , 715 ,− 215 ) /∈33.
Next consider three subgames of 33 one by one.
For 33, let x1 =0 and we obtain the subgame 231 =213, and let x2 =0 and we obtain the subgame 232 =223. These
two subgames of 33 have been considered above.
For 33, let x4 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 234 = {234, U234}, where
U34 =
(
3 −2
4 −2
)
.
234 = {(x1, x2) : x1, x20, x1 + x2 = 1} = {(x1, 1 − x1) : 1x10}.
By Theorem 3.1, 234 has a unique ESS (0, 1), which corresponds to x = (0, 1, 0, 0) in 40.
By Deﬁnition 2.1, check x = (0, 1, 0, 0). Taking y = (0, 0, 1, 0) ∈ 40, y = x, W 40 (x, x)−W 40 (y, x)= −5< 0, i.e.,
(0, 1, 0, 0) is not an ESS for 40.
(4) For 40, let x4 = 0 and we obtain the subgame 34 = {34, U34 }, where
U34 =
( 3 −2 4
4 −2 1
−1 3 3
)
.
34 = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1, x2, x30, x1 + x2 + x3 = 1} = {(x1, x2, 1 − x1 − x2) : x1, x20, x1 + x21}. For x =
(x1, x2, 1 − x1 − x2), y = (y1, y2, 1 − y1 − y2) ∈ 34, W 34 (y, x) = yU34xT. Let⎧⎨
⎩
W 34
y1
= 0
W 34
y2
= 0
⇒
{3x1 − 6x2 = −1
7x1 − 3x2 = 2
⇒
{
x1 = 511 ,
x2 = 1333 ,
i.e., x = ( 511 , 1333 , 533 ) ∈ int(34).
By Deﬁnition 2.1, check ( 511 ,
13
33 ,
5
33 ) for 
3
4. For each y = (y1, y2, 1−y1 −y2) ∈ 34, W 34 (x, x)−W 34 (y, x)=0, but
W 34 (x, y)−W 34 (y, y)=−3y21+3y22−y1y2+ 10333 y1− 2111y2− 13 . Takingy=(0, 0, 1) ∈ 34,W 34 (x, y)−W 34 (y, y)=− 13 < 0,
i.e., ( 511 ,
13
33 ,
5
33 ) is not an ESS for 
3
4, thus (
5
11 ,
13
33 ,
5
33 , 0)is not an ESS for 
4
0.
Note that for 34, when x1 = 0, we obtain the subgame 241 = 214; when x2 = 0, we obtain the subgame 242 = 224,
and when x3 = 0, we obtain the subgame 243 = 234. These three subgames of 34 have been considered above.
Hence, (0, 15 , 0,
4
5 ) is a unique ESS for 
4
0.
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